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ABSTRACT
The first paper presents a general equilibrium framework to quantify the wel-
fare impact of firm level shocks in the home country and abroad. We take
our framework to data using sectoral level and firm level data from Portugal
in 2004. We find that welfare change at home and abroad depends on firms
domestic and foreign market shares and also the sector of the firm. Our
estimations show that exit of a large firm or a productivity increase of 10%
could have significant welfare impacts on consumers up to 1%. Our results
also highlight the importance of international trade in transmitting firm level
shocks internationally and impacting the welfare of consumers.
The second paper presents a general equilibrium framework of trade and
multinational production to quantify the impact of changes in corporate tax
rates on the location choice of multinational firms and aggregate outcomes.
Our model and results show that the British and Swedish tax rate cuts of
2012 increased the welfare of their consumers around half a percentage point
at the expense of most of other countries.
Financial Crises have always been very costly for the countries who experi-
ence them. In the third paper, we focus on the welfare value of the firms that
enter or exit during the Portuguese Crisis of 2010-14. We find that the total
and average value of exiting firms is much higher than the entering firms
during the downturn years, but these values are much closer or even equal
during the recovery years. We also realize that the total and average value
ii
of exiting firms is much higher during the crisis years compared to recovery
years, even though these numbers are almost constant for entering firms.
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CHAPTER 1
THE GLOBAL WELFARE EFFECTS OF
GRANULAR SHOCKS
1.1 Introduction
A small number of giant firms dominate exports in many countries. Fre-
und and Pierola (2015) use firm level data from 32 countries and show that
more than half of a country’s export and export growth can be accounted by
top one percent of firms. Multiple empirical papers, like Gabaix (2011) and
Di Giovanni et al. (2014a), show that shocks to large firms are responsible
for large portions of aggregate fluctuations.
Companies like Samsung or Nokia are national pride of their countries and
are responsible for a large share of its export but how valuable are these
companies for their country? if one of these firms exits the market, what
would be the welfare impact on households on that country? What is the
welfare impact of a change in a firm’s productivity?
It’s also important to study how a large firm’s productivity change or exit
can affect other countries’ welfare through international trade. So far, litera-
ture has been mostly focused on spillover effects of productivity growth of a
country, Eaton and Kortum (2002), or an industry level productivity growth,
Hsieh and Ossa (2016). However, as large firms dominate international trade,
their idiosyncratic shocks can have large effect not only in the home country
but in its trading partners.
To answer these questions, we formulate and estimate a general equilibrium
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international trade framework to quantify the effects of firm level granular
shocks in home and foreign countries. We’ll show how international trade
and these shocks interact to affect the welfare of consumers and resource
allocation. The shocks that we consider could range from very small firm
specific shocks to total exit of a firm from the market. By considering the
exit of a firm, we can estimate the value of a firm to a country and also, it’s
trading partners. By exporting to foreign countries, assuming a trade bal-
ance, large firms make it possible for consumers to have access to imported
foreign goods. Consumers gain excess welfare by consuming cheaper foreign
goods and more varieties. We would like to quantify these welfare gains for
consumers.
We find that major factors in determining welfare changes are the market
shares of the firm in the home and foreign countries and patterns of com-
parative advantage. In a granular economy, idiosyncratic firm productivity
shocks can affect sectoral comparative advantage. As these changes interact
with existing patterns of comparative advantage, prices and welfare change.
Our results show that terms of trade is a very important factor in determin-
ing welfare changes and in a given sector, larger firms can change this factor
more.
Our main finding is that firm level shocks can significantly affect the welfare
of consumers. Using sectoral trade data and firm level data from Portugal
in 2004, we find that exit of the largest exporter in each sector can reduce
the welfare of that country’s consumers by up to 1%. A 10% productivity
increase in one of the largest exporters of each sector can improve welfare in
Portugal by up to almost 0.5%. We also estimate welfare changes in the rest
of the world resulted from these shocks. Given the small size of Portugal and
it’s not so large firms, we still find welfare changes as large as 0.003% in the
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rest of the world.
Starting with Melitz (2003), international trade literature consider firm het-
erogeneity and how it shapes the firm level decision of selection into markets.
However, most of the papers assume a continuum of firms in each sector where
each firm is infinitesimal and its idiosyncratic shocks don’t have any welfare
impact. We will relax this assumption by assuming discrete and finite num-
ber of firms in each sector.
Large firms have special characteristics that distinguishes them from other
firms. Large firms are not just scaled up versions of smaller firms, they have
significant differences. Empirical studies like Bernard et al. (2003) and Eaton
et al. (2011) find that many large firms export and exporters are larger than
non-exporters on average. Larger firms also import bigger shares of their
intermediate inputs from foreign countries. Amiti et al. (2014) use firm data
from Belgium to show that large exporters are large importers simultane-
ously. As shown in De Loecker et al. (2016) and Amiti et al. (2014) large
firms charge higher markups and their mark up elasticity with respect to firm
price is also higher, meaning that larger firms offset the reduction of their
marginal cost by increasing their markups.
These empirical findings confirm that we need a framework with international
trade, firm level imports and variable markups to be able to fully capture
the impacts of firm level shocks in a granular economy.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. There is a growing litera-
ture on granular trade models started by Eaton et al. (2012) and Di Giovanni
and Levchenko (2012). These papers depart from the convention of treating
firms as points of continuum so shocks to individual firms can have aggregate
effects.
Recently, Gaubert and Itskhoki (2016) estimate a multi-sector granular trade
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model using French firm level data. They are mostly focused on how gran-
ularity affects the comparative advantage pattern in a country and welfare
gains from trade. However, we are focused on welfare effects of firm level
shocks. They use a data generating process and draw productivities from a
pareto distribution but we use actual firms so we can estimate the welfare
value of existing firms.
There are a few other papers like Atkeson and Burstein (2008), Edmond
et al. (2015) and Amiti et al. (2014) that allow firms to be large compared to
their market and as a result, firms strategically interact with each other. We
follow these literature when extending our model to a Bertrand competition.
Our paper is related to the literature that estimate welfare impact of pro-
ductivity changes in open economies. Hsieh and Ossa (2016) estimate the
welfare effect of Chinese productivity growth between 1995-2007 and Di Gio-
vanni et al. (2014b) simulate the spillover effects of hypothetical Chinese
growth. In contrast to these papers, we are focused on productivity changes
of firms and firm exits.
A large group of international trade literature apply exact hat algebra to
solve quantitative trade models. We apply the methods used in Dekle et al.
(2008a) and Caliendo and Parro (2015) but we take it to a new level by using
it for firm level variables.
Recently, a group international trade papers, Halpern et al. (2015), Gopinath
and Neiman (2014) and Blaum et al. (2015), have tried to estimate the pro-
ductivity and welfare changes from imported inputs. Similar to these papers,
we consider the impact of firm level imports on the price index of consumers
and their welfare.
Our paper also relates to classical trade literature on immiserizing growth.
Bhagwati (1958a) and Bhagwati (1958b) show that in a two-country, two-
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commodity model, under certain circumstances, economic growth may reduce
the real income of the growing country. This happens when there is sufficient
deterioration in terms of trade to the extent that it offsets the beneficial ef-
fects of expansion.
Samuelson (2004) uses a simple two-country, two-sector model to illustrate
how China’s technical progress in its export sector might lower China’s per
capita real income. We’ll show in our empirical part that productivity growth
of a granular firm in comparative advantage sector of a country, can lead to
reduction in the welfare of that country.
1.2 Model
We build a quantitative general equilibrium trade model that is multi-sector
and takes into account inter-sectoral linkages. Our model is based on the
models of Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Hsieh and Ossa (2016) but the
number of firms in each sector is discrete and finite.
There are N countries in the world, indexed by the superscript j or n =
1, 2, ..., N . There are S sectors in each country, indexed by s with Mns number
of firms that we take as fixed.
The production function for a firm in country n is given by a Cobb-Douglas
function using labor, capital and intermediate good bundle:









Where Ansi is the total factor productivity of the firm.
Each firm’s output can be consumed at home or can be exported to any









Where Y njsi is the output of firm i that is exported from country n to country
j. τnj is the iceberg trade cost of shipping from country n to j and τnn = 1.












σs > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across different firm outputs within a
sector and it changes from sector to sector.
Sector output Ys in country j is also a CES aggregate of sectoral bundles of











To calculate the demand for firm outputs, we maximize the profit of each
sector in each country. Solving the problem for sector s output in country j
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We are not including any fixed cost in our profit equation and we abstract
from entry and exit of other firms in the event of an idiosyncratic shock to
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one firm.
Obviously, a productivity shock to a large firm will cause some other firms
to exit or enter the market, but the firm that operates on the margin of
producing or not is small and its exit or stay will have negligible impact
on aggregate outcomes. Edmond et al. (2015) check this intuition in their
paper. They set the fixed costs to zero and find that treating the set of firms
as fixed is a good approximation for their model. We believe that the same
holds in our paper. Our empirical results at the end of the paper show that
median firms have small aggregate values and smaller firms would be even
less valuable.
Extensive margin will be important in models that take into account the
chain effect of firm exit like Baqaee (2016). When production networks are
considered, extensive margin of firm entry and exit could greatly amplify
idiosyncratic firm shocks. However, absent detailed firm to firm trade data
and detailed input-output tables, our model abstracts from such networks.
Assuming that firms don’t take into account the effect of their pricing decision
on the price index, we solve the profit maximization problem of firms. Later,
we relax this assumption and let firms take into account the effect of their
prices on price index, taking other firms’ prices as given. This will result in
a Bertrand competition.
Maximizing (2.5) subject to (2.2), (1.2) and (1.5) yields the equations for the
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(1.8)
As expected, firm prices are a fixed markup over marginal cost. Also, from































Using (1.7), (1.3) and (1.5), we can derive an equation for Price index of

















And we can write total expenditure on industry s goods imported from coun-










In order to take this model to data, we calculate a firm from country n’s














Aggregate sector s good exported from country n to j, Y njsi , can be used as
consumption good by consumer or as intermediate good by firms, meaning
that production has a roundabout nature:





These consumption and intermediate goods will be combined across sectors










The parameter ξnjs is the share of consumption goods from sector s in total
imports of consumption goods from country n into country j and the param-
eter ζnjs is the share of intermediate goods from sector s in total imports of
intermediate goods from country n into country j.
We then combine the bundles of consumption goods imported from different
countries to create a final consumption good in each country using a CES



















Where ε is the elasticity of substitution among bundles of consumption and
intermediate goods imported from different countries.
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1.2.1 Import behavior of firms
Large firms import larger share of their intermediate input from foreign coun-
tries. To take into account the effects of these imports on the price index
and welfare of consumers, we allow different firms to have different sourcing
strategies in this model.
Ωsi is the set of countries from which firm i imports intermediates. We take
this set to be fixed. As Gopinath and Neiman (2014) empirically demon-
strate, firm entry into and exit from import status is not very important for
aggregate outcome. We also don’t include a fix cost of importing in our profit
function because in our model, firms only import the overall aggregated good
from each country and we don’t consider import of each good.




























In order to take the model to data, we calculate share of inputs that firm i
















We assume there is a representative consumer in country n that supplies
Ln units of labor and Kn units of capital inelastically. The representative
consumer owns all the firms in country n and all the firm profits will return
to the consumer. As a result, representative consumer’s budget constraint in
country n can be written as:
P nCC



















Dn is an exogenous international transfer to the consumer to account for
trade imbalance and we have
∑N
n=1D
n = 0. We consider it to be fixed share
of sectoral revenue in each country as in Dekle et al. (2008a). It can be
calculated by aggregating over net exports of sectors.







j + ξnjs λ
njP jCC
j (1.23)
Where γnj is the share of intermediate goods in country j imported from
country n and λnj share of final good in country j imported from country n.
Combining (2.19) with (1.23) and (1.9)-(1.11), we can write an equation for
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We assume labor and capital are freely mobile across sectors but can’t move
between countries. This equalizes wages and capital rents across sectors in
each country.
1.2.3 General equilibrium effects of granular firm shocks
In this part, we’ll investigate the effects of exogenous shocks to productivity
of firms, Asi. In the extreme case, the welfare value of an exporting firm
can be calculated meaning that if the firm shuts down, how much the total
welfare in a country will go down.
We use the hat algebra method proposed by Dekle et al. (2008a). By using
this method, we’ll be able to solve the model for proportional changes of
equilibrium variables. Proportional change in variable x is defined as x̂ =
x′/x where x′ is the value of variable x in the counterfactual equilibrium.
We first apply the hat algebra to the unit cost of inputs for each firm or ψnsi.
Using equations (1.8) and (1.20), we can write the proportional changes in
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Ânsi is the exogenous productivity shock to firms in country n. In the extreme
case that a firm shuts down, we set Ânsi to zero.























































































































Capital and labor market clearing conditions, equations (1.25) and (1.26),










K̂ns = 1 (1.35)
Equations (1.27)-(1.35) create a system of equations with {Ânsi} as exogenous
input and
{P̂ njs , Ŷ njs , L̂ns , K̂ns , Q̂ns , ŵn, R̂n} as unknown that will be endogenously deter-
mined.
Using the hat algebra has made it possible to write the equations with co-
efficients that are observable in the data. Given the values of the parameters
{ζjns , ξjns , αns , βns , σs, ε} and firms’ sectoral revenue share in their domestic and
export markets, we can calculate the unknowns using these equations.
Using hat algebra, we don’t need to estimate some unknown parameters and
variables like {Ansi, τnj, Ln, Kn}. We just impose restrictions on the values
of these parameters such that predicted expenditures perfectly match actual
expenditures given values of {ζjns , ξjns , αns , βns , σ, ε}.
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1.2.4 Extension: Variable Markups
So far, we have been assuming firms don’t take account the effect of their
pricing decisions on sectoral price index and consequently, everything was
derived under a monopolistic competition setup.
To take into account firm strategic complimentarities, we solve firm’s profit
maximization equation (2.5) again but this time assuming firm internalize
the effect of its price on price index, taking other firms’ prices as given. This
will result in a Bertrand competition.
Firm’s pricing equation can now be written in proportional changes as:













εnjsi = σs(1− ω
nj
si ) + ω
nj
si (1.38)
We can use these equations to calculate the counterfactual market shares
and prices of each firm and then calculate the counterfactual markup and
proportional change in markups.
1.2.5 Welfare Analysis
. Assuming an identical utility function, welfare of the representative con-
sumer can be written as her consumption: Wn = Cn. Using the consumer’s
budget constraint, we can calculate proportional change in the welfare. First
15
































After solving proportional change equations, we can calculate changes in wel-
fare resulted from firm shocks.




























In this section, we explain the data sets that we use, estimate the parameters
and describe the algorithm to solve the model. We use firm level data from
Portugal to quantify the impacts of firm levels shocks in 2004.
1.3.1 Data
We consider a 2 country world where one country is portugal and all other
countries are combined as rest of the world. The model can be estimated for
any N country setting but we only consider a two-country world for now.
We obtain sector level trade and expenditure data from the World Input-
Output Database, Timmer et al. (2015). This dataset provide sectoral level
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expenditure on goods from all countries and all sectors dissected into inter-
mediate good expenditure and final consumption expenditure. We combine
all sectors from ”Electricity, Gas and Water Supply” to ”Private Households
with Employed Persons” into one sector called Non-tradables and use other
sectors as World Input-Output tables. As a result, we end up with 17 sectors.
We use 2 sources of firm data from Portugal. The firm balance sheet level
data for 2004 is obtained from Instituto Nacional de Estatstica (INE), the
Portuguese Statistics Institute. This data set provides information on firm’s
sector of operation, gross output, intermediate good consumption, employ-
ment and also country of origin.
Customs data for 2004 is provided by Foreign Trade Statistics (FTS). This
data set is the country’s official data source for foreign trade statistics. It
contains information on all export and import transactions of firm’s located
in Portugal by production category and country of source or destination.
Trade transactions in this dataset are free on board, meaning they exclude
any duties or shipping charges. These Portuguese datasets are used for dif-
ferent analyses in Bastos et al. (2016) and Dias et al. (2016).
For each firm we calculate two sufficient statistics from the firm level data:
firm’s market share in Portugal and rest of world, ωsi, and the share of firm’s
intermediate inputs that is imported from foreign countries, γsi. We calcu-
late these values for every firm that exists in both customs and balance-sheet
data and use them to exactly match the model to firm level data.
1.3.2 Parameter Estimation
Elasticity of substitution in each sector, σs, is a very important parameter
in this analysis. This parameter is used to determine the elasticity of sub-
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stitution between different firm outputs and also between sectoral bundles
imported from different countries. We use the methodology of Oberfield and
Raval (2014) and Blaum et al. (2015) to estimate these elasticities from firm
level data.
















We calculate elasticities for each firm and then averages at each sector to get
the values of σs. Table 1.1 shows these elasticities of substitution and a list
of 17 sectors that we use. Our values have an average of 3.21 which is in the
range of other literature and elasticity values for different countries.
To estimate values of αs and βs, we use the Socio economic accounts of
World Input-Output table. These data file contains values of employment
and capital stocks at the sector level for all countries and thus, it can be





Capital Compensation in sector s




Labor Compensation in sector s
Gross output of sector s
ζnjs and ξ
nj
s , the shares of final and intermediate expenditure from each coun-
try and for each sector, are calculated from data using sectoral expenditure
on foreign and domestic goods.
As in Gopinath and Neiman (2014), we take the value of ε to be 4. This
parameter manages the elasticity of substitution among bundles of goods
imported from different countries and it’s value won’t change the results
much.
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1.3.3 Solving for the general equilibrium
To solve the general equilibrium values of unknown variables, we use an al-
gorithm similar to Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Caliendo and Parro (2015).
We first guess a vector of wages and capital rents for all countries: ŵn and
R̂n. Having these values we iterate on equations of price index and unit cost,
(1.27) and (1.28), until they converge to values consistent with given wages
and capital rents. Given the obtained price indexes, we can solve equations




s , (1.29) and (1.33). Then, we check if equations (1.25)
and (1.35) hold, meaning that labor and capital markets clear. If they don’t
clear, we return to the first step and adjust vectors of ŵn and R̂n.
The main challenge of this iteration compared to sectoral level analyses is
that when we try to solve equations (1.29) and (1.33), we convert them to
a system of SN linear equations in SN unknowns. But, since our firm level
shocks are very small, the corresponding matrix is very close to a singular
matrix and calculating its inverse creates big errors, if possible at all. To re-
solve this issue, we don’t solve the inverse of the matrix everyone and instead,
starting from equilibrium, we calculate the changes from previous iteration
until we get convergences.
Once we extend the model to include strategic complementarity among firms,
another layer of iteration will be added to our algorithm. When calculating
the price indexes, we also need to iterate on the changes in markup of each
firm until all values are consistent.
We check for the uniqueness of our solution by starting from different initial




Our framework is well-suited for variety of counterfactual analyses including
exit of one firm or multiple firms and productivity changes to one or multi-
ple firms. Since we exactly match our model to observed firm level statistics
from firm level data, we can estimate these counterfactuals for actual existing
firm as opposed to simulated firms that are drawn from a certain parametric
distribution.
We can also use the model to isolate the impacts of an observed firm produc-
tivity change or exit from other changes in the economy over a certain time
period.
1.4.1 Impact of firm productivity growth
We, first, consider the impacts of productivity growth of a single firm. Our
goal is to quantify the welfare impacts of a plausible productivity shock that
could happen in the economy to an existing firm. Literature take values
between 8% to 20% for the standard deviation of the innovation to idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks, as in Carvalho and Grassi (2015) and Clementi
and Palazzo (2016).
To comply with literature, we quantify the impacts of a 10% productivity
change. Table 1.2 shows the result of such quantification. For each sector, we
apply the shock to the largest firm and the median firm in terms of exports,
and also in terms of domestic sale.
Results emphasize the importance of the large firms for the economy and
also the importance of international trade in determining the welfare values.
These shocks could improve the welfare of the Portuguese consumer by up
to 0.4%.
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The market share of the firm at home and rest of the world and the sector
of the firm determine the value of this welfare change. As classical literature
show, patterns of comparative advantage could make this impact positive or
negative. If a firm in a comparative advantage sector of Portugal faces a
positive productivity change, rest of the world could experience a positive
terms-of-trade effect but Portugal could experience a negative terms of trade
welfare change.
As we can see in table 1.2, Portugal’s welfare goes down after a positive
productivity shock to the largest exporters in sector 1 which is a compara-
tive advantage sectors for Portugal. This firm is a export-oriented firm with
much more export than domestic revenue. As their productivity increases,
Portuguese exports become cheaper and a negative term-of-trade effect dom-
inates the welfare change. When we run the same simulation for some other
firms in sector 1 with more domestic sale than export, we get positive wel-
fare changes. This is shown in table 1.2 for the largest firm of sector 1 in
terms of domestic sale. As the productivity of this firm increases, the neg-
ative terms of trade impact is not as large as the largest exporter case and
it’s comepnsated by the direct postive impact of productivity increase and
cheaper goods that consumers access at home.
To gain more insight on this result, we check the relative change in real wages
after productivity shock to these two firms. When productivity of the firm
with largest domestic sales increases, the change in real wages of sector 1, or
ŵ/P̂1, is 0.057%, which results in welfare improvement for consumers. How-
ever, when productivity of the largest exporter increases, sector 1’s real wage
increases only by 0.007% which is not enough to increase the real consump-
tion at home and will lead to welfare decline at home.
Samuelson (2004) shows this counterintuitive outcome with a simple exam-
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ple of China and US trades. He mentions that China’s technological progress
in it’s export sector may lower China’s per capita income. In Samuelson’s
numerical example, US always gains from such change because its terms of
trade improves. But, depending on elasticities, China’s terms of trade could
deteriorate so much that it’s consumption per capita plunges below it’s value
before this change.
1.4.2 Impact of exogenous firm exit
We, then, consider a counterfactual in which a firm exits the market for an
exogenous reason and calculate the aggregate impacts of this exit. In a model
with continuum of firms, such an exit will not have any aggregate impact but
it will be shown that, in our granular model, this can have significant impacts
on consumer and the economy at home and abroad.
Table 1.3 shows the simulated welfare impact of firm exit. For each sector,
the welfare change from the exit of the largest firm and median firm in terms
of export, and also in terms of the doemstic sale are shown.
Results emphasize the value of large firms for the economy of Portugal. Exit
of the largest firms of different sectors could reduce the welfare of the Por-
tuguese consumer by up to 1%.
Like the productivity increase case, we see some counterintuitive results. Exit
of the largest firms in one of the sectors has positive welfare change for Por-
tugal, confirming that the sector of each firm has a very important role in
determining the value of that firm.
When a firm exits the market, labor and capital move from the sector of
that firm to other sectors. To examine this sectoral reallocation we show
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the labor proportional changes after the exit of the largest exporter of sec-
tor 15 in table 1.4. Sector 15’s labor decline by 27% and other sectors gain
labor. Since elasticities of substitution are different, sectors with higher σs
gain more than sectors with lower σs.
To better understand the labor reallocation and remove the effect of elastici-
ties, we simulate the exit of largest exporter in sectors 10 and 15 with σs = 3.2
for all sectors. As we see the results of labor reallocation in Portugal in table
1.5, the pattern of reallocation changes. Since are model is granular, a shock
to a large firm could change the pattern of comparative advantage. As a
large exporter in a sector exits, that sector loses comparative advantage and
some other sectors gain comparative advantage. The labor then reallocates
from the sector that loses comparative advantage to the sectors that gain it.
1.4.3 Variable Markup Extension
In table 1.6, we compare the welfare impacts of a 20% productivity increase
in the largest exporters of all sectors using constant markup and variable
markup models. We have selected a large, 20%, productivity shock to high-
light the difference between the constant and variable mark up model. For
smaller shocks, values are almost the same.
As results show, welfare gains for home country is mostly smaller using the
variable markups. This is mainly because large firms absorb the productivity
shock in their mark ups and don’t decrease their price and increase their out-
put as much as the constant markup model. In the constant markup model,
there is a perfect pass-through from productivity to price.
Other firms reduce their markups as a result of productivity growth of the
largest firms. This reduction is bigger for larger firms. As a result of this,
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prices drop for other firms and consumers gain in welfare. If this effect is
larger that the effetc of the lower price decrease of the firm that faces the
productivity shock, welfare change of the variable markup case is higher. We
see this effect in the productivity shock to sector 15’s largest exporter. Oth-
erwise, welfare change is higher in the constant markup case.
Overall, results are very similar to the constant markup case and it indicates
that, in most cases, there may not be a need to consider the oligapolistic
competitions.
1.4.4 Immobile labor and capital across sectors
So far, we have assumed that both labor and capital are freely mobile across
sectors. However, many empirical studies, Brascoupe et al. (2010) and Dix-
Carneiro (2014), have shown that labor market transition may take several
years. Capital also responds sluggishly to different shocks and adjusts to new
sectors slowly.
To show the effects of intersectoral capital and labor reallocations, we esti-
mate a new version of our model that assumes labor and capital are totally
immobile across sectors. This can be considered as a short run version of
the model. We continue to assume that labor and capital freely reallocation
inside each sector across different firms. In the new model, we’ll have a sep-
arate wage and capital rent for each sector in each country.
The algorithm to solve this new version of the model is similiar to the main
algorithm with some changes. We start by guessing a wage and capital rent
vector fot each country: ŵns and R̂
n
s . Each vector has the size of the number
of sectors. By iterationg on the quations of price and unit cost, we calculate
the price indexes corresponding to the current values of wages and capital
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rents.
Equation (1.33) can then used to calculate the proportional changes in sec-
toral expenditure. We set all the values of L̂jt to 1 and use the current values
of wage to calculate expenditure changes. These values will be used to check
the consistency of equation (1.29). If this equation doesn’t hold, we update
all the values of labor and capital and return to the first step and redo evey-
thing.
The results of model estimation with immobile labor and capital across sec-
tors are shown in tables 1.7 and 1.8. The difference between these results and
the freely mobile factor model shows the importance of intersectoral factor
reallocation in determining the welfare changes.
In the case of a 10% productivity shock to the largest exporter in each sector,
table 1.7, we realise that in most of the sectors, the positive welfare gain for
the home country is higher for the case of freely mobile factors. This means
that in the short run, only part of the welfare gains are realised and rest of
the gains are achieved in the long run when labor and capital are reallocated
across sectors. As capital and labor move form other sector to the sector
that has gained productivity, welfare gains increase.
Other interesting result is the opposite sign of the welfare impact on the rest
of the world for the cases of mobile and immobile factors. In the comparative
advantage sectors of the rest of the world and in the short run, when factors
are immobile, positive procutivity shock in Portugal has a positive welfare
impact on the rest of the world. The negative welfare impacts are realized
in the long run, when factors move away from these comparative advantage
sectors.
We see similar results for the experiment of firm exit. There are smaller wel-
fare decreases after a firm’s exit with immobile factors. Rest of the negative
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impact of firm exit is realised when factors move from that sector to other
sectors. In the comparative advantage sectors of the rest of the world and
in short run, when factors are immobile, the welfare impact are negative but
as factors move from other sectors to this sector, welfare impact becomes
positive.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a framework that allows us to quantify the welfare
value of individual firms. Using exact hat algebra, we match our model to
sector level data from the world and firm level data from Portugal in 2004.
Quantitative analysis shows that large firms are important for the welfare
of consumers and idiosyncratic shocks to firm could significantly change the
welfare at home and foreign countries. Our results confirm international
trade’s role in transmitting idiosyncratic shocks across countries.
Our results show that beside domestic and foreign market shares of the firm,
firm’s sector and patterns of comparative advantage are very important in
determining the value of each firm. Policymakers need to consider these facts
when implementing laws to protect certain groups of firms or when allocating
funds to bail out certain firms.
Accuracy of our results are limited to the modeling assumptions like fixed
number of firms, market structure, production function form and also to
the accuracy of parameter estimations. Despite these limitations, our model
provides a first step for understanding the value of firms in an economy and
welfare impact of their shocks.
For future work, we are planning to use firm level data over multiple years
and observe the firms that enter and exit the market to estimate the welfare
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impact of firm entry and exit. We can also use a panel data to estimate
the dynamic welfare impacts of actual, observed firm level shocks in an open
economy. These estimates have been so far done mostly in closed models, but
our framework shows that international trade and patterns of comparative




1 Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 3.01
2 Mining and Quarrying 4.08
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 4.77
4 Textiles and Textile Products 2.99
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 2.78
6 Wood, Products of Wood, Cork 3.89
7 Pulp, Paper and Publishing 2.21
8 Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear Fuel 4.57
9 Chemicals, Chemical Products 2.73
10 Rubber and Plastics 2.50
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 2.06
12 Basic Metals, Fabricated Metal 2.58
13 Machinery, Nec 2.69
14 Electrical, Optical Equipment 2.70
15 Transport Equipment 2.99
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 2.89
17 Non-tradables 5.18
Table 1.1: Elasticities of Substitution
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Largest Firm Median Firm
Sector Category Portugal Rest of World Portugal Rest of World
1
Export -0.00152% +0.0000201% -0.0000007% +0.000006%
Domestic sale +0.00176% +0.0000169% +0.00002% +0.000006%
2
Export +0.0954% -0.000431% +0.00165% -0.0000131%
Domestic sale +0.0554% -0.000248% +0.00316% -0.0000199%
3
Export +0.0205% +0.0000235% +0.00100% +0.000005%
Domestic sale +0.0480% -0.000008% +0.000205% +0.000006%
4
Export +0.00424% -0.000003% +0.0000380% -0.00000304%
Domestic sale +0.00576% -0.000007% +0.0000514% -0.0000049%
5
Export +0.0337% -0.000142% +0.000535% -0.0000081%
Domestic sale +0.0216% -0.0000888% +0.000133% -0.00000631%
6
Export +0.0725% -0.000277% +0.000611% -0.00000805%
Domestic sale +0.0666% -0.000236% +0.000758% -0.00000871%
7
Export +0.0779% -0.000212% +0.00183% -0.0000091%
Domestic sale +0.0779% -0.000212% +0.0000851% -0.00000593%
8
Export +0.000917% -0.0000093% +0.000917% -0.0000093%
Domestic sale +0.000917% -0.0000093% +0.000917% -0.0000093%
9
Export +0.146% -0.000519% +0.00716% -0.0000293%
Domestic sale +0.146% -0.000519% +0.000558% -0.00000769%
10
Export +0.176% -0.000712% +0.00101% -0.00000962%
Domestic sale +0.176% -0.000712% +0.000409% -0.00000727%
11
Export +0.0143% -0.0000331% +0.000105% -0.00000599%
Domestic sale +0.0395% -0.0000551% +0.00005% -0.0000078%
12
Export +0.0257% -0.000061% +0.00119% -0.00000815%
Domestic sale +0.0155% -0.000036% +0.000129% -0.00000601%
13
Export +0.0699% -0.000267% +0.000278% -0.00000683%
Domestic sale +0.0699% -0.000267% +0.000400% -0.00000732%
14
Export +0.101% -0.000325% +0.000715% -0.00000818%
Domestic sale +0.189% -0.000612% +0.000286% -0.00000683%
15
Export +0.416% -0.00146% +0.0207% -0.000082%
Domestic sale +0.0405% -0.000153% +0.00159% -0.0000112%
16
Export +0.0466% -0.000175% +0.000156% -0.0000064%
Domestic sale +0.0112% -0.0000410% +0.000095% -0.0000061%
Table 1.2: Welfare gain from 10% firm productivity shock
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Largest Firm Median Firm
Sector Category Portugal Rest of World Portugal Rest of World
1
Export +0.00742% -0.0000747% +0.000086% -0.000007%
Domestic sale -0.00819% -0.0000594% -0.000015% -0.0000064%
2
Export -0.265% +0.00118% -0.00488% +0.0000274%
Domestic sale -0.160% +0.000702% -0.00927% +0.0000465%
3
Export -0.0449% -0.0000636% -0.00229% -0.000005%
Domestic sale -0.108% -0.000004% -0.000446% -0.000006%
4
Export -0.0199% -0.0000209% -0.000171% -0.0000001%
Domestic sale -0.0274% +0.0000120% -0.000232% +0.00000505%
5
Export -0.175% +0.000707% -0.00299% +0.0000179%
Domestic sale -0.118% +0.000457% -0.000819% +0.00000888%
6
Export -0.220% +0.000815% -0.00198% +0.0000127%
Domestic sale -0.209% +0.000716% -0.00244% +0.0000152%
7
Export -0.539% +0.00112% -0.0151% +0.0000332%
Domestic sale -0.539% +0.00112% -0.000849% +0.00000729%
8
Export -0.00229% +0.0000145% -0.00229% +0.0000145%
Domestic sale -0.00229% +0.0000145% -0.00229% +0.0000145%
9
Export -0.676% +0.00214% -0.0400% +0.000137%
Domestic sale -0.676% +0.00214% -0.00322% +0.0000164%
10
Export -0.907% +0.00341% -0.00674% +0.0000309%
Domestic sale -0.907% +0.00341% -0.00279% +0.0000157%
11
Export -0.133% +0.000247% -0.00117% +0.00000792%
Domestic sale -0.387% +0.000478% -0.000546% +0.00000631%
12
Export -0.150% +0.000302% -0.00747% +0.0000203%
Domestic sale -0.0957% +0.000190% -0.000912% +0.00000761%
13
Export -0.372% +0.00136% -0.00170% +0.0000121%
Domestic sale -0.372% +0.00136% -0.00240% +0.0000147%
14
Export -0.488% +0.00137% -0.00417% +0.0000191%
Domestic sale -0.952% +0.00266% -0.00173% +0.0000114%
15
Export -1.036% +0.00209% -0.0994% +0.000369%
Domestic sale -0.193% +0.000698% -0.00768% +0.0000321%
16
Export -0.221% +0.000779% -0.000883% +0.00000894%
Domestic sale -0.0573% +0.000186% -0.000570% +0.00000763%
Table 1.3: Welfare gain from firm exit
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Sector Labor Portugal Labor ROW
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 1.0043 0.9999
Mining and Quarrying 1.0329 0.9999
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1.0137 0.9999
Textiles and Textile Products 1.0153 0.9998
Leather, Leather and Footwear 1.0162 0.9997
Wood, Products of Wood, Cork 1.0182 0.9999
Pulp, Paper and Publishing 1.0057 0.9999
Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear Fuel 1.0151 0.9999
Chemicals, Chemical Products 1.0144 0.9999
Rubber and Plastics 1.0118 0.9999
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 1.0032 0.9999
Basic Metals, Fabricated Metal 1.0113 0.9999
Machinery, Nec 1.0160 0.9999
Electrical, Optical Equipment 1.0148 0.9999
Transport Equipment 0.7349 1.0006
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 1.0096 0.9999
Non-tradables 1.0003 0.9999
Table 1.4: Proportional sectoral labor changes after the exit of the largest
exporter in sector 15
Sector Sector 10 Sector 15
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 1.0032 1.0048
Mining and Quarrying 1.0128 1.0181
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1.0029 1.0079
Textiles and Textile Products 1.0082 1.0160
Leather, Leather and Footwear 1.0094 1.0191
Wood, Products of Wood, Cork 1.0077 1.0107
Pulp, Paper and Publishing 1.0069 1.0104
Coke, Petroleum, Nuclear Fuel 1.0048 1.0074
Chemicals, Chemical Products 1.0095 1.0171
Rubber and Plastics 0.8666 1.0152
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 1.0060 1.0066
Basic Metals, Fabricated Metal 1.0090 1.0135
Machinery, Nec 1.0098 1.0202
Electrical, Optical Equipment 1.0091 1.0175
Transport Equipment 1.0103 0.7354
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 1.0053 1.0122
Non-tradables 0.9992 1.0002
Table 1.5: Proportional sectoral labor changes in Portugal after the exit of
the largest exporter in sectors 10 and 15. We set σs = 3.2 for all sectors so
elasticities don’t affect the results
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Constant Markups Variable Markups
Sector Portugal Rest of World Portugal Rest of World
9 +0.3112% -0.001111% +0.3098% -0.001105%
10 +0.3697% -0.001503% +0.3697% -0.001503%
14 +0.2148% -0.0006909% +0.2151% -0.0006916%
15 +0.9495% -0.003432% +0.9503% -0.003434%
Table 1.6: Welfare gain from 20% firm productivity shock to the largest
exporter of some sectors for constant and Variable markups
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Mobile factors Immoblie factors
Sector Portugal Rest of World Portugal Rest of World
1 -0.00152% +0.0000201% -0.00764% +0.00000388%
2 +0.0954% -0.000431% +0.00210% +0.00000006%
3 +0.0205% +0.0000235% +0.0309% -0.0000119%
4 +0.00424% -0.000003% +0.00482% +0.0000065%
5 +0.0337% -0.000142% +0.00364% +0.0000061%
6 +0.0725% -0.000277% +0.0157% -0.0000003%
7 +0.0779% -0.000212% +0.0335% +0.0000639%
8 +0.000917% -0.0000093% +0.000136% -0.000334%
9 +0.146% -0.000519% +0.0416% +0.000025%
10 +0.176% -0.000712% +0.0231% +0.000036%
11 +0.0143% -0.0000331% +0.00811% +0.0000118%
12 +0.0257% -0.000061% +0.0138% +0.0000145%
13 +0.0699% -0.000267% +0.0159% +0.0000046%
14 +0.101% -0.000325% +0.0362% +0.0000385%
15 +0.416% -0.00146% +0.103% +0.000124%
16 +0.0466% -0.000175% +0.00832% +0.0000120%
Table 1.7: Welfare gain from 10% firm productivity shock to the largest
exporter in each sector
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Moble factors Immobile factors
Sector Portugal Rest of World Portugal Rest of World
1 +0.00742% -0.0000747% +0.0363% -0.0000173%
2 -0.265% +0.00118% -0.00571% -0.0000093%
3 -0.0449% -0.0000636% -0.0722% +0.0000267%
4 -0.0199% -0.0000209% -0.0231% -0.0000321%
5 -0.175% +0.000707% -0.0195% -0.0000363%
6 -0.220% +0.000815% -0.0501% -0.00000177%
7 -0.539% +0.00112% -0.269% -0.000634%
8 -0.00229% +0.0000145% -0.000335% +0.0000005%
9 -0.676% +0.00214% -0.234% -0.000197%
10 -0.907% +0.00341% -0.145% -0.000348%
11 -0.133% +0.000247% -0.0767% -0.000116%
12 -0.150% +0.000302% -0.0845% -0.000095%
13 -0.372% +0.00136% -0.0913% -0.0000319%
14 -0.488% +0.00137% -0.210% -0.000248%
15 -1.036% +0.00209% -0.490% -0.000968%
16 -0.221% +0.000779% -0.0415% -0.0000714%






Multinational production (MP) has been rising rapidly in the past few decades.
Firms are increasingly producing their products away from their country of
origin and export them to multiple destinations. There are multiple factors
that determine the choice of production locations of firms.
Multiple empirical studies have shown that the corporate tax rate is an im-
portant factor in determining firms’ location choice. Barrios et al. (2012)
utilize a large international firm-level data set and estimate that the impact
of both host and parent country tax rates are negative on the location of new
foreign firm subsidiaries. Devereux and Griffith (1998) study a panel of US
firms locating in the European market and show that the effective average
tax rate significantly impacts the choice between locations.
However, there aren’t many general equilibrium quantitative studies on the
impact of taxes on the location choice of multinationals and how this choice
affects the welfare and other aggregate outcomes in the host country. Most
of the related studies consider tax or subsidy competition across different
regions in a country or study the movement of capital across different coun-
tries.
In this paper, we develop a multi-country general equilibrium framework to
quantify the aggregate impact of corporate tax rate changes in any country.
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In the model, firms choose their location of production to maximize their
profits based on cost of production, trade and MP costs and tax rates in
each country. We’ll show how changes in tax rates affect the overall profits
in each country and how they lead to changes in wages, prices and welfare of
the consumers.
Results confirm that when a country unilaterally reduces its corporate tax
rates, it attracts more multinational products and it improves the welfare
of its population at the expense of other countries. The main mechanism
at work here is agglomeration. As tax rates of a country decline and firms
open more affiliates there, consumers benefit from lower price index in that
country. Domestic firms also benefit from this lower price index by using
cheaper intermediate goods.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. There is a large and
vibrant literature focused on quantitatively modeling trade and MP and esti-
mating the welfare gains from them. Irarrazabal et al. (2013) present a quan-
titatively estimable expansion of Helpman et al. (2004) paper to study the
proximity-concentration trade-off between exporting and MP. Their model
incorporates both fixed costs of exporting and MP and as a result, equa-
tions can’t be aggregated and solved easily for the purpose of our study.
Ramondo and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013) extend the Ricardian trade model of
Eaton and Kortum (2002) to add multinational production. Their model al-
lows counter-factual analysis in a multi-country setup but it’s not appropriate
for our analysis as firms have a profit of zero in a perfect competition environ-
ment. Arkolakis et al. (2017) take this model to a parametrized monopolistic
competition setup of Melitz (2003). In their model, countries endogenously
specialize in innovation or production and this specialization is important
in determining the gain or loss of each country from MP. By replacing the
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plant-level fixed cost with export fixed costs, they have been able to create
a tractable multi-country model with equations that easily aggregate. How-
ever, because of absence of MP fixed costs, their model generates too many
affiliates that are smaller compared to data. Tintelnot (2017) adds the fixed
cost of establishing plants and estimates the model using numerical meth-
ods. As a result of addition of the plant-level fixed costs, the equations in
his model can’t be aggregated easily.
Our paper is also related to regional fiscal competition papers. Fajgelbaum
et al. (2018) develop a quantitative economic geography model to study state
taxes as a potential source of spatial misallocation in the United States. They
find that difference in state tax rates lead to aggregate losses and study the
impact of recent tax reforms. Ossa (2018) constructs a similar quantitative
economic geography model to study subsidy competition among US states.
He solves for the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative and cooperative
games of subsidy competition and estimates welfare gains of subsidizing firm
location by a state at the expense of others.
There is also a large literature on tax competition that study the movement
of capital across countries or regions. While they only focus on outflow of
capital, the insights of their analysis can be used for an analysis consid-
ering multinational firms. Building on the classic models of Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), Keen and Konrad (2013) present
a static, multi-country tax competition model where capital is the mobile
factor. Mendoza and Tesar (2005) explain why the capital integration of Eu-
ropean union in 1980 didn’t result in a race to bottom. They use a dynamic,
neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition.
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2.2 International Tax System
Countries use one of the two methods for taxation of income earned abroad:
The worldwide method and the territorial method. Under the territorial
method, income earned by multinational affiliates abroad is wholly or par-
tially exempt from home country taxation. Under the worldwide system,
multinational firms need to pay home country taxes on the income earned
abroad, once it’s repatriated. A credit is usually given for taxes paid to
foreign governments (PWC (2013)). Under this system, companies have in-
centive to keep profits abroad to avoid paying taxes to the home country
upon repatriation.
Since from the beginning of this century, many countries have switched from
the worldwide method to the territorial method and exempt 95-100% of the
profit earned by affiliates in some or all of the foreign countries. Most no-
tably, UK and Japan adopted the territorial system, with exemption applied
to all countries, in 2009. As of 2012, 28 of 34 OECD countries use territorial
system and US recently switched to this system as well.
In this paper, to make the analysis more straight forward and to focus on
desired economic forces, we only consider and include countries with terri-
torial tax system and assume they exempt 100 percent of foreign income.
Including countries with worldwide method would complicate the equations
and we would lose tractability and also, the issue of profit repatriation would
require a two-period or dynamic model instead of our current static model.
We also abstract from the issue of profit shifting. As shown in Zucman
(2014), large multinational firms increasingly use transfer pricing to shift
profits to foreign tax havens to reduce their tax bill. These tax havens in-
clude European countries like Ireland or Luxembourg and also Bermuda and
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other Caribbean islands.
There are several empirical studies on the issue of profit shifting to tax
havens. Harris et al. (1993) and Hines Jr and Rice (1994) show evidence
of profit shifting to tax havens. Clausing (2003) provides evidence of trans-
fer mis-pricing for the purpose of profit shifting from US multinational data.
Hebous and Johannesen (2015) use data from German multinationals to show
they use trade in services to shift profit to tax havens. In a similar study,
Liu et al. (2017) use UK tax system change of 2009 from worldwide to ter-
ritorial to exhibit that British multinationals manipulate transfer prices to
shift profits to tax havens.
However, not all firms engage in these tax haven operation. As shown in
Desai et al. (2006), tax haven profit shifting is mostly done by larger firms.
According to Gumpert et al. (2016), reallocation of taxable income to tax
havens is difficult and only 20.4% of German multinationals have tax haven
affiliates. Not accounting for profit shifting to tax haven by manipulating
transfer prices and other means is an important limitation of our analysis.
When multinational firms have the option of avoiding taxes by shifting profits
to tax havens, they will not be as responsive to tax rate changes in coun-
tries as predicted by our model. However, as noted above, these operations
are available only to certain and limited number of firms and industries and
not including them in the model doesn’t discredit the result. Adding profit




We develop a model of trade and multinational production that is suitable
for analyzing the impact of corporate tax rates on firm location choice and
aggregate outcomes. We assume a market structure of monopolistic compe-
tition as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008).
There are N countries in the world indexed by i, l or n. Each country has
fixed and exogenously given measures of firms, Mi, and workers, Li. There
is a continuum of goods, ω ∈ Ω and each good is produced by a single firm.









where σ is the elasticity of substitution and pi(ω) is the price of good ω in
country i.
Each firm uses two factors of production: labor and intermediate goods. Pro-
ductivity of a firm consists of a core productivity component, φ, and a vector
of location-specific productivity shifters, z = (z1, ..., zN). The production









where ll is the labor and il is the intermediate goods used in country l.








with the restriction that κ+ 1− σ > 0. zl for the firm is drawn from Frechet




Each country’s only tax is a proportional tax on the profits of the firms lo-
cated in that country. Government will use these tax revenues to provide
a public good to consumers. Using these simple proportional taxes as op-
posed to distortionary taxes keeps the model simpler and more tractable.
Proportional taxes won’t affect the mark-up of firms and firm will continue
to charge the standard CES mark-up of σ/(σ − 1). However, taxes will still
affect firm’s location choice by impacting the effective cost that firm faces in
each country to produce.
2.3.1 Firm’s problem
To simplify the analysis, we assume firms don’t face any fixed cost of es-
tablishing a plant in the home country or abroad and they don’t face any
marketing fixed cost of exporting either. Each firm will optimally choose a
country to produce its product and sell it in all countries.
Consider a firm from country i that locates in country l and sells to all coun-
tries from there. The revenue of this firm from selling its product to country
n is (piln/Pn)
1−σXn, where piln is the price of selling in country n and Xn is
the total expenditure in country n. The overall profit of this firm is:













where tl is the proportional tax on the profit of a firm producing in country




l is the cost
of the cost-minimizing bundle of factors and wl is the wage in country l. τln
is the iceberg trade cost with τll = 1. γil is the iceberg bilateral MP cost
with γll = 1. These MP iceberg costs capture variety of costs a firm incurs
when producing in a foreign country from legal and communication costs to
technology transfer cost.
Firm decides to locate in country l, if l maximizes this profit function over
all potential production locations. Since zl has a Frechet distribution with
parameter θ, (2.5) shows that firm profit is also Frechet-distributed with the
parameter θ/(σ − 1).
From the properties of Frechet distribution, we know that it is a max stable
distribution, meaning that the maximum of Frechet-distributed random vari-
ables is also Frechet-distributed. As a result, maxl πil is Frechet-distributed
as well.
Using above results, we conclude that probability of a firm form i locating












































Here, Πil is proportional to the expected profit of a firm from i located in l
and Ψi is proportional to the expected profit of a firm originated from i that
chooses the production location to maximize the total profits. ψil can also
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be considered as the ratio of the firms from i that locate in l. As evident
from above equations, tax rates have important roles in the location choice
of each firm and countries can attract more firms by lowering their corporate
tax rates.
2.3.2 Aggregation
Similar to heterogeneous firm trade literature, we define an average produc-
tivity measure in each country. As firms select the location of their produc-
tion, we can assume there is a single representative firm located country l





This relationship can be combined with equation (2.1) to write down the








where piln(z̃l) is the price of sales from l to n by firms originated from i
assuming they all have productivity z̃il.
Using above results and integrating over all values of φ, we can calculate the
total sales of firms from i to n through country l:
Xiln = Miψil(piln(z̃il)/Pn)
1−σXn (2.10)
As in Arkolakis et al. (2017), we use these values to construct trade and MP
shares for each country so we can take the model to data. Trade shares are
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MP shares are defined as share of production in a country from firms origi-






Letting Πiln be the profits associated with sales Xiln, from standard CES
properties, we get:




Summing over countries, total profit of firms from i located in l, can be writ-
ten as: Πil = (1− tl)
∑
nXiln/σ.
2.3.3 Government and Workers
The Government of each country taxes the profits of all firms located in that
country. It uses this revenue to supply a public good, G, to the consumers
in that country. Total revenue of the government can be written as:




where Π̃il is the gross total profit of firms from i producing in l, before taxes.
We assume there is a representative worker at each country that supplies all
the labor and owns all the firm originated from that country. Utility of the
representative worker is a Cobb-Douglas function of a consumption good, C,
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where un capture natural and general characteristics of each country that
affect the utility of anyone living there. αn is the Cobb-Douglas coefficient
that changes country by country.
2.3.4 General Equilibrium
To close the model and solve for its general equilibrium, we first write down
the goods market clearing condition. The final aggregate good, Qn, produced
in each country can be either consumed by workers, Cn, or used by firms as
intermediate goods, In, or by governments to provide the public good, Gn:
Qn = Cn + In +Gn (2.16)
Multiplying both sides with the price index, we can get an equation for the
total expenditure in country n, Xn:
Xn = PnCn + PnIn + PnGn (2.17)
To obtain the labor market clearing equation, we should only consider the
labor used for production in each country as there are no fixed costs of






where Yl is the total value production in country n and it’s equal to
∑
i,nXiln.




Πil + wiLi + ∆i (2.19)
where ∆i is the exogenous international transfer to consumers as in Dekle
et al. (2008b). These transfers account for total trade and MP imbalance for
each country.
Combining this equation and the equation for government expenditure, we










Π̃ji + ∆i (2.20)
2.3.5 General Equilibrium in proportional changes
To solve the model for an actual or counter-factual change in tax rates, we
write the general equilibrium equations in proportional changes. Propor-
tional change in any variable x, will be written as x̂ = x′/x, where x′ is the
counter-factual value of the variable and x is its initial value. Starting from a
set of tax rates in different countries, {tl}Nl=1, tax rates could change to a new
set of rates, {t′l}Nl=1, and we would like to calculate how aggregate variables,
and especially welfare, respond to these changes.
First, using the expression for the cost of cost-minimizing bundle of goods,































































































To calculate the change in welfare we need changes in the consumption good



























Above equations can be solved once we calibrate the values of needed pa-
rameters and obtain the trade and MP share as well as labor expenditure in
each country. For any exogenous change in tax rates, changes in all aggregate
outcomes, and especially welfare, will be obtained.
2.4 Data and Calibration
We limit the analysis to 13 countries that use territorial system for the taxa-
tion of international income, as in 2012, and we can find reliable multinational
production data for them: Italy, Germany, France, Spain, UK, Austria, Por-
tugal, Sweden, Canada, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Czech Republic.
Country level trade, expenditure and labor income data is acquired from
world input-output tables, Timmer et al. (2015). Multinational production
data is obtained from OECD AMNE Database Activity of Multinational
Enterprises and Eurostat Foreign Affiliate Statistics database for 2012. We
have compared the values from these two sources and used the average of
values, if there is any discrepancy between them, however, for countries in
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our analysis, most of the values match. This dataset is used to created the
MP shares, λMil , and also trade shares, λ
T
ln. These shares will be directly
used in equations and will also be used to calibrate the values of Xiln with a
procedure similar to the one in Arkolakis et al. (2017).
Even though many papers have used the MP data provided in Ramondo
et al. (2015), we have decided to construct a new MP dataset for 2012 from
aforementioned sources . The main reason is that the dataset in Ramondo
et al. (2015) is constructed as an average dataset over 1996-2001, when most
countries were still using the worldwide international tax system.
As a result of using the values in relative changes, we don’t need to estimate
some parameters like trade and MP iceberg costs, τln and γil. This approach
puts restrictions on these iceberg costs so that the predicted values for trade
and MP shares exactly match the observed values from data.
There are a few parameters that need to be calibrated. We estimate the share
of labor and intermediate input, βn, from the world input-output tables for
all countries. For each country, αn is calibrated as Rn/GDPn or the share
of tax revenues to GDP for country n. These values are obtained from the
world bank datasets.
Like most of the literature, we set σ = 4 to get a markup of 33% for firms.
As in Tintelnot (2017), we set the shape parameter of Frechet distribution
of productivities to θ = 7. This value is close to the median value for the
shape parameter of productivity distribution in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
Given the values of these calibrated parameters and trade and MP shares
from data, we can solve equations (2.21) to (2.31) using an iterative proce-
dure to get relative changes in welfare and other aggregate outcomes.
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2.5 Simulations and Results
Our frameworks can be used to estimate the impact of actual or counter-
factual changes in the tax rates of one or multiple countries. In the section,
we show the results and their interpretation for a few scenarios. We use the
calibrated value of parameters mentioned in the previous section.
Table 2.1 shows the top combined corporate tax rates of the list of our coun-
tries in 2012 from PWC (2013). We use these tax rates as the proportional
tax rates on profits in our analysis. All these countries use territorial tax
system in 2012 and exempt 95 or 100% of the income earned abroad from
home country taxation.
2.5.1 UK corporate tax rate cut
In 2012, it was announced by the British chancellor of exchequer that cor-
porate tax rate will be cut to 21% by April 2014 from its 2012 level of 24%.
This tax cut was made to close the gap with some European tax havens
like Ireland and Luxembourg and to reduce the amount of tax avoidance by
multinational firms who would shift profits to these tax havens.
Table 2.2 demonstrates the results of this tax rate cut in UK according to our
model. This table shows the percentage change for each country in welfare,
v̂n, in real expenditure, X̂n/P̂n, and in real wage, ŵn/P̂n.
In this analysis, other countries keep their 2012 taxes and nothing else
changes, so we can isolate the impact of British tax cuts. As expected,
after this tax cut, UK gains at the expense of most of other countries by
attracting more firms and production to its land. Extra economic activity
more than enough compensates for lower tax rates and increases the total
revenue of UK government.
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When UK cuts tax rates, according to our model, the probability of multi-
national firms choosing UK as the location of production, or ψil, increases.
This increase in the number of firms located in UK results in more varieties
produced at home which reduces the price index that its citizens face.
Since we are assuming labor force is fixed for each country and can’t move
across borders, increased demand for labor in UK, resulted from increased
production, will put upward pressure on wages. Increased wages will improve
the welfare of UK consumers by increasing their real consumption and also
improving UK’s terms of trade.
Results show that the impact of UK tax cuts on other countries depends on
the how much they trade with UK. Most of the countries see a reduction
in their welfare as UK attracts more multinational firms at their expense.
However, countries who trade more with UK, benefit from lower UK price
index through their imports and from larger demand in UK through their
exports compared to countries that trade less with UK.
As it could be seen in table 2.2, Germany and Belgium are the only countries
whose welfare doesn’t decline as a result of this change and that’s because of
the large size of their trade with UK with respect to the size of their economy.
Rest of the countries’ welfare and real wages decline.
2.5.2 Swedish corporate tax rate cut
Swedish government cut their corporate tax rates in 2012 from 26.3% to 22%
to absorb investment and improve their competitiveness and job growth,
Thomann (2014). This tax cut followed multiple reports indicating that
Swedish tax base is suffering from large amounts of profit shifting by multi-
national firms to low tax countries.
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Table 2.3 shows the aggregate effects of this tax cut in Sweden and rest of the
countries. Results bear a lot of similarities to the results of tax cut in UK.
Sweden gain around 0.5% in welfare and most of the other countries lose,
except for Norway and Finland who have large trade volumes with Sweden
compared to the size of their economies.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we quantify the impact of corporate tax rates on the location
choice of multinational firms and aggregate outcomes including the welfare
of consumers. We create a multi-country general equilibrium model of trade
and multinational production where each country applies a proportional cor-
porate tax on the profit of firms producing there.
We calibrate the model for 2012 and use it to quantify the effects of actual
tax cuts in UK and Sweden. These tax cuts attract more firms and economic
activity to these countries and improve the welfare of consumers by up to
0.5% at the expense of other countries. These results show that tax cuts
benefit these countries significantly.
Like any other analysis, ours comes with limitations. We obtain these results
from a theoretical framework and their accuracy is limited by the modeling
assumptions and simplifications that we have made. We are also abstracting
from other taxes that each government collects from firms and individuals,
like sales and income taxes. Including these taxes could impact our results
to some extent.
Also, as mentioned earlier, we are abstracting from the issue of profit shift-
ing of large firms to tax havens by manipulating their transfer price or other
methods. This issue could impact the accuracy of our results as firms don’t
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necessarily keep their profit in the same place as their productions. By estab-
lishing tax haven operations, firms could reduce their foreign tax payments,
so the corporate tax rates and their changes may not matter for them as
much.
For future research, the list of countries could get limited to European union
countries, so labor movement in response to tax rate changes could be in-
cluded in the model. This movement of labor across countries can have im-
portant implications for the model and change the results significantly. We
could also add a tax haven with zero tax rate to the list of the countries and
give firms the option of profit shifting to this tax haven with certain costs.


















Table 2.1: Corporate tax rates in 2012
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Country Welfare Real Expenditure Real Wage
Italy -0.02% -0.1% -0.01%
France -0.01% -0.09% -0.01%
Germany +0.01% -0.01% +0.008%
Spain -0.02% -0.07% -0.01%
UK +0.41% +0.39% +0.27%
Austria -0.15% -0.23% -0.1%
Portugal -0.15% -0.25% -0.1%
Sweden -0.05% -0.15% -0.02%
Canada -0.06% -0.14% -0.02%
Belgium +0.002% -0.04% +0.001%
Finland -0.14% -0.21% -0.05%
Norway -0.13% -0.21% -0.09%
Czech Republic -0.17% -0.24% -0.1%
Table 2.2: Effect of UK’s tax cut in 2012 from 24% to 21%. Values are in
proportional changes.
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Country Welfare Real Expenditure Real Wage
Italy -0.08% -0.1% -0.05%
France -0.04% -0.06% -0.02%
Germany +0.001% -0.001% -0.001%
Spain -0.07% -0.09% -0.05%
UK -0.02% -0.03% -0.01%
Austria -0.14% -0.11% -0.09%
Portugal -0.12% -0.13% -0.1%
Sweden +0.53% +0.37% +0.29%
Canada -0.1% -0.14% -0.05%
Belgium -0.05% -0.04% -0.02%
Finland +0.04% +0.01% +0.01%
Norway +0.04% +0.01% +0.01%
Czech Republic -0.15% -0.19% -0.06%
Table 2.3: Effect of Sweden’s tax cut in 2012 from 26.3% to 22%. Values
are in proportional changes.
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CHAPTER 3
FIRM ENTRY AND EXIT DURING A
CRISIS: EVIDENCE FROM PORTUGUESE
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2010-14
3.1 Introduction
A growing number of theoretical and empirical studies have been trying to
understand the cyclical behavior of firm entry and exit. In this paper, we
analyze the value of firms that enter and exit over the business cycle using
firm level data from Portugal over the period of 2010-2014 Portuguese finan-
cial crisis.
This crisis was a result of Portugal not being able to repay its government
debt after the great recession. Portugal’s economy contracted 5.3% from
2010 to 2012 and unemployment rate rose to 16% in 2012. Eventually, IMF
and European union agreed to a bailout worth 78 million Euros and Por-
tugal underwent an adjustment program which included austerity measures
and structural reforms (Reis (2015), Portugal (2015) and Gurnani (2016)).
In this paper, we’ll focus on the firm level aspects of this crisis.
We will use the methodology developed in Dias and Sarhangian (2018) to
estimate the welfare value of each firm that enters or exits. According to this
approach, the value of each firm is defined as the welfare loss in the home
country after the firm exits the market for exogenous reasons. We can apply
this method to firms that enter and exit to measure how much the firms
that exit are worth compared to those that enter at different points of the
business cycle. One advantage of this method is that it includes a general-
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equilibrium, multi-country international trade structure and different sectors
of the economy. As a result, the revenue share of the firm in both domestic
and export markets, firms sector and patterns of comparative advantage all
determine the value of the firm.
We find that, on average, firms that exit during the height of the crisis in
2010-12 are more valuable than firms who enter during these years and also
they are more valuable than firms who exit during the recovery years. These
result indicate that crises push more valuable firms out compared to the reg-
ular years.
There are many papers analyzing the cyclicality of entry and exit rates and
also the characteristics of entering and exiting firms. Campbell (1998) shows
that entry rates are correlated positively with output growth in US, meaning
that they are pro-cyclical, but exit rates are counter-cyclical. Moreira (2016)
finds that firms entering during recessions are not only smaller, they also
remain smaller during their life cycle. Lee and Mukoyama (2015) use US
Annual Survey of Manufactures to show that exit rates are almost equal for
good and bad years, but entry rates are pro-cyclical and they decline signif-
icantly during recessions. They also observe that the relative productivity
of entrants is higher in recessions compared to boom times, even though the
relative productivity of exiting firms is almost constant over the business cy-
cle.
Some other papers model the entry and exit dynamics. Clementi and Palazzo
(2016) study the effect of entry and exit on the aggregate dynamics and find
that they amplify and propagate the effects of aggregate shocks. They point
out that entry rate is pro-cyclical, as opposed to exit rate that is counter-
cyclical. Lee and Mukoyama (2008) include a cyclical entry cost in a general
equilibrium dynamic model to explain entry and exit patterns in data. A
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similar framework is build in Bilbiie et al. (2012) which includes an endoge-
nous entry cost.
Our paper also relates to studies of crises in different countries. Sandleris and
Wright (2014) for the Argentine Crisis of 2001 and Oberfield (2013) for the
Chilean crisis of 1982 are two examples of these papers. They mostly focus
on the decline of growth factor productivity in these countries and major
contributors to this decline, while we study the value of firms pushed out of
the market during crisis and the value of entering firms.
Since Melitz (2003), the extensive margin of trade and firm entry-exit has
received a lot of attention in international trade literature. Recently, in a
working paper, Hsieh et al. (2016) estimate that gains from entry-exit or
”new” gains from trade for Canadian firms was negative after Canada-US
Free Trade Agreement in 1980s. Our paper is related to this paper in the
sense of having an international trade structure and considering welfare im-
pacts of firm entry and exit, however we don’t estimate the trade gains from
entry-exit but welfare value of each entering or exiting firm.
3.2 Data
We use firm level data from Portugal between 2010 and 2015. Our dataset
contains balance sheet variables, domestic and foreign sales and the value of
domestic and foreign inputs used by the firms. Table 3.1 shows the number
of firms entering and exiting the market and the rates of entry and exit. To
calculates these statistics, we have omitted the firms that have zero sales.
Our statistics are in line with the results of literature, for example Clementi
and Palazzo (2016). Entry rates are pro-cyclical, they decline during the
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Year Number of Entry Number of Exit Entry rate Exit rate
2010 19303 21104 6.05% 6.62%
2011 22971 23164 7.24% 7.30%
2012 19849 20670 6.41% 6.68%
2013 24312 17310 7.87% 5.60%
2014 25114 16378 7.96% 5.19%
2015 25039 17073 7.76% 5.29%
Table 3.1: Entry and Exit statistics
crisis years of 2010-2012 and increase at the recovery years of 2014-2015,
whereas the exit rates are counter-cyclical, they are higher during the crisis
years and decline after the recovery starts.
3.3 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we estimate the welfare value of entering and exiting firms
for each year in Portugal and rest of the world. According to the methodol-
ogy developed in Dias and Sarhangian (2018), we estimate the value of each
firm by calculating the percentage change in the welfare of consumers, if that
firm’s productivity drops to zero for exogenous reasons.
Table 3.2 exhibits the welfare value of all firms that enter or exit in each year.
The absolute value of the entry and exit numbers show how much the welfare
of consumers will decline if all the firms, entering or exiting, are removed and
their factors of production are reallocated to other firms in the same sector
and other sectors.
All numbers for Portugal, entry and exit, are negative indicating that overall
value of both entering and exiting firms has been positive for Portugal every
year and their removal will reduce the welfare of consumers. However, we
see some positive numbers on the exit column of the rest of the world. These
60
Year Entry Portugal Exit Portugal Entry ROW Exit ROW
2010 -0.2369236 -0.8726862 -0.0002025 +0.00062980
2011 -0.2188702 -0.9899928 -0.0003386 +0.00063309
2012 -0.1650697 -0.5005393 -0.0004411 -0.00013802
2013 -0.1894232 -0.4066929 -0.0006636 -0.00013642
2014 -0.2641372 -0.2824458 -0.0004085 -0.00035653
2015 -0.2081749 -0.3741266 -0.0006155 +0.000002826
Table 3.2: Entry and Exit Welfare
numbers mean that the exit of these firms in Portugal increases the welfare
in the rest of the world during some of the years. This happens because
during these years most of the exiting firms are in comparative disadvantage
sectors of Portugal and their exit increases the comparative advantage of the
rest of world compared to Portugal. As a result, the welfare in the rest of
world slightly increases in some of the years.
To adjust for the different entry-exit rates, we divide the welfare numbers
by the number of entering or exiting firms in Portugal. Table 3.3 shows the
number of entering firms, number of exiting firms, average welfare value of
entering firms and average welfare value of exiting firms in Portugal for each
year.
Year # of Entry # of Exit Average value: Entry Average value: Exit
2010 19303 21104 -1.22739E-05% -4.13517E-05%
2011 22971 23164 -9.52811E-06% -4.27384E-05%
2012 19849 20670 -8.31627E-06% -2.42157E-05%
2013 24312 17310 -7.79135E-06% -2.34947E-05%
2014 25114 16378 -1.05175E-05% -1.72454E-05%
2015 25039 17073 -8.31403E-06% -2.19133E-05%
Table 3.3: Average Entry and Exit Welfare
Our results, both total and average welfare values, show that the welfare
value of entering firms is almost constant over the business cycle. However,
the welfare value of exiting firms is higher during the height of the crisis,
2010-2012, compared to recovery years of 2014-2015. We also realize that
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the welfare value of exiting firms is higher compared to the value of entering
firms every year. This difference is much more emphasized in the years of
2010-2012 when crisis was affecting the economy much more negatively.
To gain more insight on the quality of entering and exiting firms, we calculate
the share of the value added of entering and exiting firms in the total value
added of all firms. Results are shown in table 3.4.
Year Incumbents Entrants Survivors Exiters
2010 99.53% 0.47% 98.82% 1.18%
2011 99.44% 0.56% 98.76% 1.24%
2012 99.58% 0.42% 99.37% 0.63%
2013 99.35% 0.65% 99.55% 0.45%
2014 99.22% 0.78% 99.50% 0.50%
2015 99.35% 0.65% 99.45% 0.55%
Table 3.4: Value added Shares
As shown in the table, exiting firms carry a larger share of total value added
of all firm in 2010-2012 compared to later years when recovery starts. This
is in line with the welfare table results where the exiting firms have larger
welfare value at the height of the crisis. The value added share of exiting
firms declines as recovery gradually starts from 2013.
The correlation coefficient that we obtain over time between the value added
share and welfare value of exiting firm is 0.98. It shows that the value added
share and welfare value of exiting firms are highly correlated and they are
both higher in the crisis years. We find a much smaller correlation coefficient
of 0.57 for entry.
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3.4 Conclusion
Financial crisis of 2010-14 caused high unemployment, negative growth rates
and high budget deficits in Portugal. In this paper, we use the methodology
in Dias and Sarhangian (2018) and analyze the welfare value of firms that
enter and exit during the crisis and estimate how much they are worth to
the consumers.
We find that, on average and overall, firms that exit during the crisis time
are worth more to the consumers compared to firms that exit during after the
recovery starts. The welfare value of firms who exit during the crisis years
is much higher than firms who enter, however these values are much closer
during the recovery years. These results show that more valuable firms are
pushed out during the downturns.
Since our framework includes a multi-sector international trade structure,
our measure of firm’s welfare value is affected by the sector of the firm and
its export activities. Basically, revenue is not the only determinant of the
welfare value of each firm, but where the firm sells to is also very important.
Therefore, our analysis provides a more reliable measure of firm value than
just using its revenue or productivity. However, in future research, a dynamic
model can be developed to better measure how valuable the firms that exit
during the downturns are for the consumers. This will help us better under-
stand the negative impacts of economic crises.
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